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I. INTRODUCTION

Judicial and legislative recognition of oppression of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is nothing new.' Minority shareholders in a close corporation face a unique dilemma.2 As a general prin-

* Dedicated to Ms. Anne Titshaw for the fundamentals and to L.B. for the "push in the back."

1.See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.26,
at 111 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS]. Both Illinois and Pennsylvania
included oppression as a ground for statutory relief as early as 1933. 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT
B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7.13, at 79 (2d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter O'NEAL, OPPRESSION]. The United Kingdom even included oppression in the Companies
Act of 1948. Id.
2. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 18.4.1, at 785-86 (1986); O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 8.07, at 65. See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505, 511-15 (Mass. 1975) (providing a brief overview of close corporations). The term close corporation has been given a number of different meanings. Id. at 511. The Donahue court said a close corporation has the following characteristics: "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for
149
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ciple, the majority shareholders govern the corporation.' Unlike the minority shareholders of a publicly-traded corporation, disgruntled minority
shareholders of a close corporation have no ready market for their shares.
Thus, the controlling shareholders have the opportunity to exploit the
minority by preventing minority interests from having a say in the operation of the enterprise.5 Alternatively, the majority may deprive the minority of employment in the corporation, leaving the majority with the
minority's capital, but conferring no return on the minority's investment.

the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management. direction
and operations of the corporation." Id. The Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model
Business Corporation Act says a corporation must have 50 or fewer shareholders to qualify for close
corporation status. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT § 3(b) (1984).
3. F. HODGE O'NEAL & JORDAN DERWIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES---"SQUEEZE-OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES § 1.03 (1961).

4. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514; CLARK, supra note 2,§ 18.4.1, at 785-86; O'NEAL & DERWIN,
supra note 3, § 2.15; see also O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 8.07, at 63 (explaining
that shareholders in a close corporation do not have a ready market in which they may sell their
shares).
5. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, § 3.05; O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1,
§ 8.07, at 63.
6. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, § 3.05. The oppression scenario described assumes no
dividends are paid and is only one of many ways the majority can exploit the minority. See O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1,§ 8.07, at 64. Denial of employment or cancellation of dividends
are generally considered indirect means of "squeezing-out" the minority. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics v.
Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277-78 (Alaska 1980) (diversion of corporate funds); Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976) (removal of minority shareholder from payroll);
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (withholding of dividends); O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 8.07, at 63-64. Note that at the time of the Ford decision, Ford
Motor Company was a close corporation not the large corporate entity it is today. Brent Nicholson.
The Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation Shareholders: A Callfor Legislation, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 513.
515 (1992).
A Virginia case provides a good example of a combination of indirect squeeze-out techniques.
In White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1972), plaintiff and defendant formed a Subchapter S Corporation with plaintiff owning 45% and defendant owning 55%. Id. at 317. Plaintiff was the only employee of the company and received a weekly salary. Id. at 317-18. Plaintiff asked defendant to declare dividends to the shareholders because plaintiff was paying federal taxes on money he was not
receiving. Id. at 318. Upon a refusal to pay dividends, plaintiff requested that defendant buy-out
plaintiff's shares. Id. Defendant refused and then terminated plaintiffs employment when plaintiff
instituted a lawsuit. Id. at 318-19. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant's conduct
was oppressive and remanded the case for a determination of whether dissolution was appropriate. Id.
at 320.
More direct means are also available to the majority when attempting to squeeze-out the minority. The majority may approve a merger with a plan to ultimately "cash out" the minority. Matteson
v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025, 1035-36 (Wash. 1952). In addition, the majority may approve a sale of the
corporation's assets to the majority at a price below actual value. Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189
A.2d 675, 678-79 (Del. 1963). After the sale, the original corporation may be dissolved to eliminate
the minority. Id. This note will address only the more indirect variety of squeeze-out described in the
text. Under Florida Statutes, minority shareholders are more adequately protected when the majority
uses a direct variety of squeeze-out. See, e.g.. FLA. STAT. § 607.1302 (1993) (granting dissent and
appraisal rights to shareholders after consummation of a plan of merger or sale of assets). See generall' O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3 (providing an exhaustive examination of various squeeze-out
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Minority shareholders traditionally had only one remedy-to sell their
shares to the majority at a depressed price, leaving the majority in control
and the minority excluded from their investment
Exploitation of minority shareholders has prompted various judicial
remedies designed to even the playing field.- In addition, most states have
legislation that permits a minority shareholder to effectively redress his
grievances through dissolution proceedings or some other relief.' However, despite the fact that Florida is one of the most popular states in which
to incorporate,"0 the Florida legislature has not made "oppression" a
ground for statutory relief.
This note analyzes the current remedies available to minority shareholders under Florida law and identifies the gap left by the absence of a
statutory remedy for oppression. Part II of the note traces the development
of judicial and legislative remedies in other jurisdictions and compares
them with Florida's development. Part I explores the problem with the
Florida legislature's decision to omit oppression as a statutory ground for
relief. Finally, part IV proposes a number of solutions that would eliminate some of the Florida legislature's concerns, yet still provide oppressed
minority shareholders with adequate relief.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF REMEDIES FOR
OPPRESSED MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

A. Nonstatutory JudicialRelief
Before the widespread adoption of statutory relief for oppressed minority shareholders, the courts differed in their treatment of the problem
and the remedies they provided." Courts originally viewed dissolution as

techniques).
7. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
8. See O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 66.
9. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 1, § 7.13, at 79; Marilyn B. Cane, Oppressive Conduct:
Should It Be Grounds for Judicial Dissolution?-Judicial Dissolution Response, FLA. B. BUS. L. SEC.,
Q. REP., Dec. 1993, at 20, 20; see also MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (West 1990) (stating that
a shareholder of a close corporation can seek relief from acts that are "willfully unfair and oppressive"
to the shareholder); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 1.(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (acting "in a
manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders").
10. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 1993, at 539, tbl. 862 (113th ed. 1993). The number of businesses that incorporated in
Florida between 1988 and 1991 represents the highest total of any state over that time period. See id.;
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK

1991, at 258 (1991). For the years 1986-1991, new business incorporations in Florida represented
approximately 12% of all new business incorporations in the United States. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 1993 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 685, tbl.

24.78 (27th ed. 1993).
11. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 1, § 7.10.
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beyond their powers.' 2 But a 1933 Michigan case, Flemming v. Heffner
& Flemming, 3 likened a close corporation to a partnership and used the
court's equity power to dissolve the entity. 4 In Flemming, the controlling
shareholders deprived the minority of participation in the management and
control of the business. 5 While acknowledging that courts generally do
not have the power to wind up corporations, the Flemming court found
that an exception applies where circumstances have made it impossible to
carry out the corporate purposes.' 6
Similarly, in Leibert v. Clapp'7 the Court of Appeals of New York
used its equity power to dissolve a corporation despite the absence of
statutory authority to do so. 8 The plaintiffs in Leibert complained that
the controlling shareholders were continuing the corporation solely for
their own benefit at the expense of the plaintiffs.' 9 The plaintiffs alleged
that the majority's actions were designed solely to force the minority to
sell its interest at a deflated value.2" Under the New York statute, shareholders could bring a derivative action only to compel dissolution.'
However, the Leibert court stated that the persistent abuses by the majority
shareholders made it inappropriate to restrict the minority to multiple,
costly, and difficult derivative actions.22
Cases such as Flemming and Leibert paved the way for statutory relief
for oppressed shareholders seeking dissolution of a corporation. But some
courts now view their statutory remedies as exclusive. 23 Thus, in states
12. People ex rel. Daniels v. District Court, 80 P. 908, 911-12 (Colo. 1905) (noting the limitation
that in the absence of a permissive statute courts of equity have no power to appoint a receiver).
13. 248 N.W. 900 (Mich. 1933).
14. Id. at 902. Some commentators and courts have rejected this partnership analogy. See FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 241, 243
(1991) (expressing concern that traditional corporate norms will break down if a minority shareholder
can withdraw his capital at will).
Judge Easterbrook also has expressed his dislike of the partnership analogy in opinions he has
authored for the Seventh Circuit. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991). In Bagdon, Judge Easterbrook wrote "[wihether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. Commercial rules should be predictable; this objective is best
served by treating corporations as what they are, allowing the investors ... to vary the rules by contract .... Id.
15. Flemming, 248 N.W. at 901.
16. Id. at 902. The trial court described the corporate affairs as being in a "chaotic condition." Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan agreed, recognizing that the object of a corporation is to advance the
pecuniary gain of its stockholders. Id. The Flemming court stated that when the dissension reaches a
level at which it is impossible for the corporation to obtain the object of increasing profits of stockholders, the court may use its equity power to wind up the affairs of the corporation. Id.
17. 196 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 1963).
18. See id. at 541.
19. Id. at 542.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 543.
22. Id.
23. See Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (II1. 1957) (maintaining that
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which omit oppression as a statutory ground for dissolution, shareholders
succeed in dissolving the corporation only if they meet one of the enumerated statutory criteria, In effect, a court's equitable authority to grant relief
outside the bounds of the statute has been eroded in some jurisdictions."
B. Statutory Relief in Other Jurisdictions
In 1933, Illinois and Pennsylvania became the first states to directly
address the problems faced by minority shareholders in a close corporation.'s Each state included oppression as a ground for dissolution in its
corporation statutes.26 These state statutes set the stage for the oppression
provision in the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Law
Institute Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),27 first suggested to
the state legislatures in 1950.
In 1984, the ABA issued the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA) - which moved the oppression provision to the Involuntary
Dissolution section of the Act.29 Section 14.30 of the RMBCA provides
in relevant part:
The [name or describe court or courts] may dissolve a corporation:

the authority of courts of equity to order dissolution is limited by corporate statutes). Contra Lewis v.
Jones, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (following Leibert in allowing the plaintiff to
seek common law dissolution).
24. See CentralStandard, 141 N.E.2d at 49. At a minimum, nonstatutory dissolution has become
rare. See O'NEAL, OPPRESSION, supra note 1, § 7.10. Professors Hetherington and Dooley found that
by 1977, only four such nonstatutory dissolution cases existed. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P.
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:A ProposedStatutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1977). The cases cited in the Hetherington and Dooley article are:
Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Tansey v. Oil Producing Royalties, Inc.,
133 A.2d 141 (Del. Ch. 1957); Levant v. Kowal, 86 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1957); and Leibert, 196
N.E.2d at 540. Id. at 8 n.14. Since 1977, only Bellevue Gardens has been followed. See Lyman v.
Spain, 774 F.2d 495, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
25. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression,48 Bus. LAW. 699,
709 (1993). Prior to the enactment of the Illinois and Pennsylvania statutes, California had a provision
allowing dissolution on grounds of "abuse of authority, or persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders." Id. at 709 n.67 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 404 (Deering 1931)). The California legislature
eliminated the provision two years later. Id.
26. Id.
27. MODEL BusINESs CORP. AcT § 97 (1969). Section 97 provided: "The __
courts shall
have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation: (a) In an action by a shareholder
when it is established: ...(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are
illegal, oppressive or fraudulent;... "'MODEL BusINESs CORP. AcT § 97 (1969). Section 97 also
listed deadlock, misapplication of corporate assets, and waste as grounds for liquidation. MODEL BusINESS CORP. AC § 97(a)(1), (3)-(4) (1969).
28. REVISED MODEL BuSINESS CORP. AcT (1984).
29. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act § 14.30 (1984).
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(2) in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that:
(ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; .. 30
The official comment to section 14.30 made clear that judicial dissolution
was permissive and that a court could decline to order dissolution at its
discretion.31 By 1993, a majority of states included oppression as a
ground for judicial dissolution 2 and still others included similar language.33
However, even in states which adopted the MBCA, RMBCA, or similar provisions, minority shareholders faced significant impediments to
receiving relief under the statutes. Taking the official comment to heart,
many courts still viewed dissolution "as a drastic remedy."' That view,
combined with the absence of a definition of oppression in the statutes,
has resulted in somewhat narrow interpretations of what constitutes oppression.35 Thus, while the courts and legislatures recognized the problems facing minority shareholders in close corporations, they were hesitant
to go too far.
In construing the statutes, some courts have maintained that dissolution is appropriate only if the corporation is near insolvency.36 Most
courts, however, have adopted somewhat broader definitions of oppression.37 For example, in Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Davis,3" the Illinois Supreme Court showed its willingness to expand the

30. Id. (brackets in original) (emphasis added). Like its counterpart in the MBCA, the RMBCA
also includes deadlock, misapplication of corporate assets, and waste as grounds for dissolution. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2)(i), (iv) (1984).
31. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2)(ii) cmt. 2b (1984). The comment states:
The application of these grounds for dissolution to specific circumstances obviously involves judicial discretion in the application of a general standard to concrete circumstances.
The court should be cautious in the application of these grounds so as to limit them to
genuine abuse rather than instances of acceptable tactics in a power struggle for control of a
corporation.
Id.
32. Thompson, supra note 25, at 709. Thirty-one states use the term "oppression." Id. at 709
n.70.
33. Id. Six states used language roughly equivalent to oppression. Id.
34. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Il1. 1960); Charles W.
Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minorit-Y Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 440 (1990).
35. See Murdock, supra note 34, at 459-60.
36. People ex rel Daniels v. District Court, 80 P. 908, 911 (Colo. 1905).
37. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1,§ 9.29, at 132-33.
38. 141 N.E.2d 45 (Il1. 1957).
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definition of oppression.39 The minority shareholders complained that
cumulative preferred dividends were in arrears for twenty-one years and
that the corporation would never be profitable enough to meet the $1
million owed.' The Central Standard court stated that oppression need
not connote "an essential inference of imminent disaster."', Oppression
can include a continuing course of conduct in which the majority takes
advantage of the minority.42 The Central Standard court also rejected the
defendant's argument that, under the statute, oppression is synonymous
with fraud and illegality.43 Three years later, the same court reaffirmed its
definition of oppression," but issued a reminder that corporate dissolution is still a drastic remedy.45
Currently, courts tend to follow a limited number of definitional approaches in actions for oppression.46 Some courts define the term as "burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct" and a "visible departure from the
standards of fair dealing."'47 Others link their definition of oppression to
the fiduciary duty owed by the controlling shareholders to the minority."
Alternatively, courts rely on the "reasonable expectations" of the shareholders. Because these definitions often overlap, conduct in a particular
case might meet all the definitional approaches."
When defining oppression, many courts seem to lean toward the link
with fiduciary responsibilities of controlling shareholders.5 In Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,52 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court no-

39. Id. at 49-50.
40. Id. at 47.
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id,
43. Id.; Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
44. Gidivitz, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
45. Id. However, the court found oppression in the cumulative acts and continuing nature of the
defendants' conduct. Id. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to the statutory remedy of dissolution. Id.
46. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1,§ 9.29, at 142-43.
47. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (citing White v. Perkins,
189 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1972)).
48. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (Or. 1973); see also Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975) (controlling group may not utilize its control
to obtain special advantages and disproportionate benefits).
49. J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable Expectations"--A Primeron an Oppressive Standard, (Part 1 of 2),
71 MICH. BJ. 434, 434-35 (May 1992) (shareholder entitled to enforce certain expectations including
a voice in management and a return on investment). See also, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (using expectations as a means of identifying and measuring conduct
alleged to be oppressive); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (complaining
that a shareholder's "rights or interests" include the shareholder's "reasonable expectations" in the corporation).
50. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 9.29, at 132-33.
51. See supra text accompanying note 48.
52. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
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tably articulated the fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders to the
other shareholders of a close corporation." The court used a partnership
analogy and said that the relationship among the stockholders in a close
corporation must be governed by "trust, confidence and absolute loyalty."'5 4 As a result, the corporation could not repurchase the shares of a retiring majority shareholder without offering a pro rata repurchase to the
other shareholders. 55
The Donahue case was not based on a statute, but courts have used it
as a starting point from which to define oppression under the statutes. In
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders,56 the controlling shareholder terminated the minority shareholder's employment and then increased his
own salary." Essentially, the controlling shareholder treated the corporation as if it were his private property. 8
The Baker court stated that what constitutes oppressive conduct is
closely related to the good faith and fair dealing owed to the minority
shareholder.59 Thus, "operation of the business for the sole benefit of the
majority of the stockholders, to the detriment of the minority stockholders,
would constitute . . . 'oppressive' conduct" and would warrant dissolution.' However, the court pointed out that it would not consider a single
breach of fiduciary duty oppressive to the extent that dissolution would be
warranted, unless the breach was extremely serious in nature.6
Another definition, determining oppression based on the reasonable
expectations of minority shareholders, is gaining favor in some jurisdictions.6 - The Court of Appeals of New York summed up the reasonable
expectations concept as follows:

53. Id. at 515.
54. Id. at 512. The court cited with approval Judge Cardozo's famous explanation of fiduciary
duty. Id. at 516. In Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), Judge Cardozo said:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A [fiduciary] is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Id. at 546.
55. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
56. 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973).
57. Id. at 390-91.
58. Id. at 396.
59. Id. at 394.
60. Id.
61. Id. Because of this position, the court refused to grant dissolution. Id. at 398. The court acknowledged that some of the majority's acts were oppressive, but noted that because the oppressive
conduct had been discontinued, the acts were not serious enough to warrant dissolution. Id. The court
also denied other relief after spelling out 10 possible alternatives to dissolution. Id. at 395-96.
62. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 9.29, at 132; Bruno, supra note 49, at
434.
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"A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the
corporation would entitle him.., to a job, a share of corporate
earnings, [or] a place in corporate management.., would be oppressed ... when others in the corporation seek to defeat those
expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the
investment."'63
The New York court used this explanation to define the meaning of the
term "oppressive" in its involuntary dissolution statute. 64 Still other jurisdictions have replaced the term "oppressive" in the statutes with reasonable expectations language.' Obviously, whether judicially defining the
term oppressive, or including a definition in the statutes, an examination
of a minority shareholder's reasonable expectations expands the chances of
obtaining effective relief.'
C. Florida'sRelieffor Minority Shareholders
Like many jurisdictions, the Florida courts traditionally have viewed
dissolution as an extreme remedy.67 In 1936, the Florida Supreme Court
stated that dissolution is not warranted unless the corporation has practically discontinued all business or is no longer capable of carrying out
corporate functions.6 8 Twenty years later, the court's attitude had not
changed much. In Jones v. Harvey,69 the Florida Supreme Court said it
would not grant dissolution where the corporation is a going concern and
solvent unless there is fraud, double-dealing, or misapplication of corporate assets." In addition, the Florida courts have rejected the argument
that close corporations are analogous to partnerships.7 As the Florida
Supreme Court stated, "[a]pparently it is only when dissension arises that
the respondents become dissatisfied with their position as stockholders."7 2

63. Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
64. Id.
65. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115
(Supp. 1993).
66. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 9.29, at 135. The use of the reasonable
expectations standard places a handy label on the policies underlying oppression statutes. Thompson,
supra note 25, at 721. For instance, shareholders in a close corporation often expect to take part in the
management of the business. Id. One policy consideration in enacting oppression statutes is to relieve
minority shareholders who have been squeezed-out of participation in management. See id.
67. See Mills Dev. Corp. v. Shipp & Head, Inc.. 171 So. 533, 534 (Fla. 1936), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 658 (1939).
68. Id. at 534.
69. 82 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1955).
70. Id. at 372.
71. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1953).
72. Id.
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Thus, the early Florida court opinions seemed hesitant to use their equity
powers to relieve oppressed minority shareholders.
The legislature did not come to the rescue. Florida is among the minority of states which fail to include oppression as a statutory ground for
shareholder relief.73 The Florida legislature declined to adopt the subsection of the MBCA dealing with oppression 4 when it first considered the
matter in 1969." 5 In 1989, Florida adopted most provisions of the
RMBCA into the Florida Business Corporation Act (FBCA)76 but left out
section 14.30 dealing with oppressive conduct.77 Instead, the legislature
substituted the existing Florida statute which was similar to MBCA section
97 but lacked any language of oppression." Currently, FBCA section
607.1430 provides in relevant part:
A circuit court may dissolve a corporation:
(2) In a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established
that:
(a) The directors are deadlocked in the management of
the corporate affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock, and irreparable injury to the corporation is
threatened or being suffered;
(b) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and
have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired ...; or
(c) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wast79
ed.

The commentary to the FBCA states that oppression was omitted because
the same provision in the MBCA was never adopted in Florida.8" In addition, the legislature feared "excessive, unnecessary litigation" by a "single,
dissatisfied shareholder."'"
The legislature and the courts of Florida seemed content to leave the

73. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (1993).
74. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1969).

75. Commentary to the Florida Business Corporation Act, in 2 HOWARD P. Ross, FLORIDA CORPORATIONS special app. 2, at SP2-43 (1993) [hereinafter FBCA Commentary].
76. See id. at SP2-1.
77. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (1993).
78. Id. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.274 (1988) (containing Florida statutory language as it existed
before being adopted for § 607.1430) with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1969) (containing the
original language considered when Florida adopted § 607.1430).
79. FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (1993).
80. FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43.
81. Id.
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problem in the hands of contract and fiduciary duty theories. In Corlett,
Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh & Levi, P.A. v. Merritt,82 the court held that
unmarketability of shares is not a compelling reason for judicial intervention." To the contrary, it is a compelling reason for the parties to agree
in advance on a redemption provision.' The Corlett court stated that the
judicial system need not protect a shareholder "from his own improvidence or lack of strength" in failing to procure such a provision." In this
absence of a general recognition by the Florida courts and Florida legislature of the minority shareholder's dilemma, oppressed shareholders who
have not protected themselves contractually are left with only a potential
action alleging breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholders.
The plaintiff in Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Roque86 proceeded on such a
fiduciary theory.' The plaintiff was holder of forty percent of the corporate stock.88 The defendants, directors who controlled the remaining sixty
percent, attempted to purchase the plaintiff's stock at a price far below
market value. 9 When the plaintiff refused to sell, his employment was
terminated.' Three months later, the controlling shareholders raised their
salaries and purchased an additional 715 shares of newly issued stock, thus
watering the plaintiff's stock down to less than five percent.9 The controlling shareholders said that the new issue of stock was designed to
bolster the corporation's credit standing and improve its ability to profitably conduct business.9' The shareholder majority recognized the
plaintiff's right to purchase his pro rata share of the new issue.93 Nevertheless, the plaintiff refused to exercise his rights.'
The Biltmore Motor court found that the controlling shareholders had
entered into a scheme against the plaintiff to buy him out at less than

82. 478 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
83. Id. at 834.
84. Id.; infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
85. Corlett,478 So. 2d at 834. It should be noted that Corlett involved a professional corporation
organized under Florida's Professional Service Corporation and Limited Liability Company Act, FLA.
STAT. §§ 621.01-.14 (1993). Id. at 829. However, § 621.13 states that the provisions of the FBCA
apply to Chapter 621 corporations unless there is a conflict. FLA. STAT. § 621.13 (1993); Corlett, 478
So. 2d at 829 n.3.
86. 291 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
87. See id. at 115.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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market value.95 The court concluded that because there was no legitimate
business purpose for the controlling shareholders' actions, they breached
their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.9 6 The court noted that while the
plaintiff had refused to exercise his preemptive rights, the offer made by
the majority was an " 'empty gesture.' "" The controlling shareholders
knew that the plaintiff would be unwilling to contribute more capital to
the enterprise when he had already been ousted from participation in the
corporation.98
It is difficult to tell if the Biltmore Motor holding" is based on a
director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders or if it is based on a controlling shareholder's duty to fellow shareholders. However, the court in Tillis
v. United Parts, Inc."° recognized that majority stockholders have a fiduciary duty not to use their control as an advantage over the other stockholders.' In Tillis, the majority stockholders caused the corporation to
purchase shares of stock from the majority at a price far above the value
of the stock on the market." 2 This put the corporation in such a desperate financial position that it had to borrow $10,000 back from the majority." 3 The minority shareholders claimed that, in effect, the majority had
paid themselves a dividend and left the minority out of the distribution."° The Tillis court cited Donahue with approval and said that unless
an equal opportunity to sell is given to the minority shareholders, the distribution of corporate assets to the majority shareholders is a breach of the
majority's fiduciary duty. 5 However, the court noted that the facts represented a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation as much as a breach
of fiduciary duty to other shareholders." 6
III. THE INADEQUACY OF FLORIDA'S STATUTORY SCHEME
In the absence of oppression as a statutory ground for relief, a minority shareholder in Florida is left with inadequate recourse. Essentially, a

95. Id. at 115-16.
96. See id. at 115.
97. Id.
98. Id. The trial court did not order dissolution of the corporation. See id. Instead, it required the
defendants to rescind the recapitalization and cancel the new issue of shares. Id.
99. See id. at 115-16.
100. 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
101. Id. at 619.
102. Id. at 618.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 619.
105. Id.; accord Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515, 518.
106. Tillis, 395 So. 2d at 619. Like Donahue, the Tillis
case was not brought on grounds of oppression. See id. at 618-20. So while Tillis may provide a theory on which to proceed, it does not directly serve as a precedent upon which minority shareholders can base a claim of oppression.
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minority shareholder who feels he is suffering oppression at the hands of
the controlling shareholders has three options in Florida:
(1) protect himself with contractual provisions at the start-up of the
enterprise;" or

(2) proceed under the guise of one of the statutory grounds for relief; 08 or
(3) proceed under a breach of fiduciary duty theory.1"9
None of these options are adequate given the nature of the close corpora-

tion and Florida's reaction to the minority shareholder's problems.
Certainly, the best way for a minority shareholder to protect himself is
through careful planning."' Contractual provisions drafted at the inception of an enterprise would eliminate most of the problems of oppressed
minority shareholders."' Such provisions might include a contract for
employment, a right to have a voice in decisionmaking, or the right to
redeem shares under certain circumstances." 2 However, while these
protections are available, it is
simply unrealistic to expect to find them in
3
a close corporation setting."
Often, the few shareholders in a close corporation are friends or family going into business together." 4 This results in a general lack of formality as to the business arrangements." 5 Instead of binding agreements,

107. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
110. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 18.4.1, at 785-86. See generally O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note
3, §§ 7.01-.13 (providing a detailed analysis of planning techniques designed to avoid squeeze-outs
and oppression of minority shareholders). The traditional view was that shareholder agreements were
void as against public policy. McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236-37 (N.Y. 1934). However, in
Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964), the court upheld a shareholder agreement designed to
protect the salary of a shareholder. Id. at 586-87. The primary factors in the court's decision were that
all of the shareholders were parties to the agreement, no creditors had been injured, and the public had
not been injured. Id. In addition, the purpose of the agreement was simply to provide a type of pension. Id. Many statutes now provide for shareholder agreements in certain situations. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 607.0731 (1993); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984).
I11. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 18.4.1, at 785-86 (arguing that careful planning and sound legal
advice can mitigate the inadequacies of statutory remedies); O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, §§
7.01-.13; supra note 110.
112. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, §§ 7.01-.13; supra note 110.
113. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 18.4.1; O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, §§ 2.17-.19; Cane,
supra note 9, at 21 ("In an ideal world the drafting of shareholder agreements with buy-sell provisions
would be the norm for all closely held corporations. It is not.").
114. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, § 2.10. Professors Hetherington and Dooley argue that
the focus on contractual abilities of shareholders misunderstands the close corporation setting. See
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 24, at 2. They argue that the focus should be on the shareholders'
ability to maintain a harmonious relationship because investors in a close corporation expect that the
shareholders will remain in agreement over the life of the business. Id.
115. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, § 2.10.
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the participants have "understandings" about the way things will work. 6
Most of the understandings are either implied or in oral form, making
them difficult, if not impossible, to enforce." 7 In addition, the arrangements as understood by the controlling shareholders may be different from
those understood by the minority shareholders." 8
The lack of formality in close corporations' business arrangements
also results in the parties' failure to foresee potential problems." 9 At the
start-up of a close corporation, there is an "atmosphere of optimism and
good will which ... obscures the possibility of future disagreements and
conflicts."'' 20 Not only do the participants often fail to protect against
future dissension, they give no thought to what happens if a majority
shareholder sells his interest to a third party who has a different philosophy about how the business should be handled. 2 ' Even if the incorporators have the foresight to anticipate problems, they may be reluctant to obtain legal counsel due to the extraordinary cost. 22 This problem is only
exacerbated by the incorporators' attraction to commercial "How To"
books, allowing them to incorporate for relatively low cost. Most contain
form contracts without necessary protective provisions. Thus, the expectation that shareholders in a close corporation will protect themselves contractually is not a realistic view.
Nor do the present grounds for involuntary dissolution under section
607.1430(2) provide adequate relief for the minority shareholder.' 23 In
the absence of a deadlock situation that fits subsections 2(a) and 2(b),'24
an oppressed minority shareholder must clothe his argument under subsection (2)(c) and allege that corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. 25 This provision does not cover even the most basic of squeeze-out
techniques. 26 If the controlling shareholders terminate the employment

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. § 2.17.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 2.18.
Id. § 2.19.
Id. § 2.18.

122. Id. § 2.19. Professor O'Neal emphasizes that when a minority shareholder retains counsel, it
is important to have separate counsel from that of the business. F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 143 (1987). Professor
O'Neal also issues a gentle ethical reminder about conflicts of interest to any attorney who represents
both sides. Id.; see also Wilton S. Sogg & Michael L. Solomon, The Changing Role of the Attorney
with Respect to the Corporation, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 160 (1987) (discussing the appropriateness of attorneys serving as directors in close corporations).
123. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(2) (1993).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(2)(a)-(b) (1993).
125. FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(2)(c) (1993).

126. See generally O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3 (examining various squeeze-out techniques in
a close corporation setting).
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of the minority shareholders and fail to distribute dividends to them, the
minority shareholders are left with no return on their investment.'27 Their
only solution is to sell their shares to the majority." Because minority
shareholders are in no position to bargain, they will receive an inadequate
price for their shares.'29 No corporate assets have been misapplied and
no corporate assets have been wasted. Consequently, the minority shareholders have no direct remedy under the Florida Statutes.
Without the availability of statutory relief, an oppressed minority
shareholder is forced to rely on judicially-crafted remedies based on
breaches of fiduciary duty. 3 Under Tillis, Florida has adopted the view
that majority stockholders have a fiduciary duty not to utilize their controlling positions to their own advantage and to the detriment of the minority. 3 ' However, Tillis is a 1981 decision.'32 Since that time, it has been
cited with approval only in the 1992 case of Cohen v. Hattaway." Cohen involved a suit by minority shareholders alleging a breach of the
majority shareholders' fiduciary duties by usurping a corporate
opportunity. 3" While a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine
fits some definitions of oppression, in Cohen the plaintiff brought the
lawsuit derivatively, so the recovery went to the corporation rather than to
the plaintiff.'35
Other than Tillis and Cohen, only Biltmore Motor seems to help a
minority shareholder in Florida.'36 Biltmore Motor is a squeeze-out case
involving termination of the minority's employment and an attempt to buy
the minority out at a depressed value.'37 However, Biltmore Motor was
decided in 1974 and has not been cited in another Florida state court decision.'38 Thus, while these three cases form the foundation of a theory
upon which an oppressed minority shareholder might rely, any protection
they offer such shareholders is tenuous at best.

127. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 3, § 3.05, at 53; O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 1, § 8.07, at 65.
128. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 51-61, 86-106 and accompanying text.
131. Tillis, 395 So. 2d at 619.
132. Id. at 618.
133. 595 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
134. Id.
135. Id. A plaintiff who recovers in .a derivative suit is usually not adequately relieved since she
remains a part of the corporation and therefore remains subject to further oppression. See infra notes
139-46 and accompanying text.
136. See Biltmore Motor, 291 So. 2d at 115-16.
137. Id. at 114-15.
138. A search of Shepard's Citations for Southern Reporter 2d through October of 1994 shows no
Florida cases citing Biltmore Motor.
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Even if the caselaw on shareholder fiduciary duty was stronger in
Florida, actions on that ground do not afford enough protection. Breach of
fiduciary duty suits are normally brought derivatively on behalf of the
corporation.'39 Any relief granted by the court will have the corporation
as its focus. 4 While this action may be enough in some instances, the
relief granted inures to the corporation, which still remains under majority
control.' 4 ' The minority shareholder is still inside the corporation facing
"the prospect of continued litigation and the spectre of continued animosity. ,' 42 Even if a derivative suit will provide adequate relief in a particular case, the procedural restrictions on bringing the suit may be too difficult for a shareholder to overcome.'4 3
For oppressed shareholders to obtain relief personally, they must show
that their injury is separate and distinct from any injury suffered by other
shareholders.'" While there is some authority which supports allowing
direct actions more frequently when a close corporation is involved,'45
the Tillis, Cohen, and Biltmore Motor cases were all based on derivative
suits.'46 As these three cases appear to be the only decisions supporting a
controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty in Florida, the ability of a minority shareholder to bring a direct action in Florida remains an uncertain
possibility.
Assuming arguendo that a direct suit can be brought for breach of a

139. Thompson, supra note 25, at 735.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 738; see, e.g., Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 613 (Del. Ch. 1974); Murdock,
supra note 34, at 440.
142. Murdock, supra note 34, at 440. In addition, when the recovery inures to the corporation, it is
subject to creditors and tax consequences. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
143. Thompson, supra note 25, at 737. For instance, the Florida Statutes require a shareholder to
make demand on the board of directors to remedy the wrong before the suit can proceed. FLA. STAT. §
607.07401(2) (1993). This requires independent disinterested directors so that conflicts of interest may
be avoided. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(3)(b) (1993). It is designed to prevent "strike suits"-frivolous
claims designed to benefit individual shareholders rather than the corporation itself. See A.L.I., Proposed Final Draft, 1992 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
7.02, at 632-33 (1992). The board's decision to reject demand is entitled to the business judgment rule
which generally defers to management's decision in the absence of some wrongdoing. See Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
Some of the procedural requirements may be less harsh in a close corporation setting. Thompson, supra note 25, at 737. For instance, making demand on the board is less burdensome in most
close corporations because they are unlikely to have independent disinterested directors. Id. As a resuit, courts may be more likely to excuse demand. Id. at 738.
144. Alario v. Miller, 354 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); see also Garner v. Pearson, 374
F. Supp. 580, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (noting that where injury is done directly to the subsidized corporations, the plaintiff may not sue on their own behalf; this is a derivative action under Florida law).
145. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1947) (permitting direct
action to enforce redemptive rights); Leibert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540, 542 (N.Y. 1963) (permitting
direct action to liquidate the corporation).
146. Cohen, 595 So. 2d at 107; Tillis, 395 So. 2d at 618; Biltmore Motor, 291 So. 2d at 115.
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majority shareholder's fiduciary duties, the plaintiff still must work around
the business judgment rule. 47 After its broad holding in Donahue, the
Massachusetts court took the opportunity to cut back on a controlling
shareholder's fiduciary duties in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 4
In Wilkes, after dissension arose between the plaintiff and the other directors, the plaintiff's salary was terminated and he was removed as a director and officer.'49 The Wilkes court recognized the fiduciary concept stated in Donahue, but stated that the majority had the right to show a legiti-

mate business purpose for their actions."' Florida adopted this limitation
in Biltmore Motor.'
While the complaining shareholders in Biltmore Motor and Wilkes
were granted relief,'52 the business judgment rule is yet another hurdle
for oppressed shareholders to clear.'53 The business judgment rule is so
deferential to management that controlling stockholders would have little

trouble justifying their actions." 4 For instance, the majority may attempt
to squeeze out a minority shareholder by terminating his employment."'
147. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) ("It must be
asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action.").
The American Law Institute has attempted to articulate the business judgment rule as follows:
(c)A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty... if:
(i) he is not interested... in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the extent he
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.
PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Tentative Draft
No. 4. ALl 1985). See generally Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty
of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237 (1986) (examining the
business judgment rule's relation to the MBCA).
148. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1967).
149. Id. at 661.
150. Id. at 663. The court noted that the minority will have a chance to come back and prove that
the reasons advanced by the majority "could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's interest." Id. There are several rationales for the existence of the
business judgment rule: (1) the rule encourages competent people to serve on corporate boards; (2) the
rule relieves a director's worries about "judicial second-guessing;" (3) the rule keeps courts out of
complex business decisions; and (4) the rule ensures that directors control the corporation, not the
shareholders. Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation:
The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1359-60 (1993).
151. Biltmore Motor, 291 So. 2d at 115. The court found no legitimate business reason for the
recapitalization of the corporation. Id. Instead, the court found that the real purpose was to water down
the minority's interest in the company. Id.
152. Id.; Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 665. Sufficient evidence was not found in either case to support
the majority shareholders' claim of a legitimate business purpose.
153. See supra note 147.
154. See supra note 147.
155. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
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If the majority can simply argue that the terminated minority shareholder
was inefficient, had a bad attitude, or any number of things, it might avoid
a breach 5of6 fiduciary duty finding and leave the minority shareholder with
no relief.
By choosing to omit statutory relief based on oppression, Florida has
left minority shareholders out in the cold. An oppressed shareholder is
currently presented with various options which are either unrealistic, unhelpful, or too uncertain to afford any real protection.'57 As a result, it is
time for Florida to catch up with the majority of other jurisdictions and
provide statutory relief for oppressed minority shareholders.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR FLORIDA

The first and most obvious step for curing the defects in the FBCA is
to adopt a provision making oppression a ground for relief.'58 The wording of RMBCA section 14.30(2)(ii) would be sufficient.' 9 In addition to
omitting oppression, the Florida legislature seemed to consider illegal or
fraudulent acts by the controlling group to be as unimportant as oppressive
acts."6° If illegal or fraudulent acts are still considered unimportant, the
legislature could leave out the words illegal and fraudulent when adopting
the RMBCA subsection.
In omitting oppression as a ground for involuntary dissolution under
the FBCA, the Florida legislature sought to avoid increased litigation. 6'
The legislature seemed concerned that a single disgruntled minority
shareholder could bring suit without having any valid grounds for doing
so.' 62 The legislature sought to prevent a suit brought solely on the
grounds that the company was operating in a manner that, in the plaintiffs

156. Id. When such a business purpose is advanced by the majority shareholders, the minority
shareholders may attempt to demonstrate that the that the same legitimate objective could be achieved
through a less harmful alternative. Id.
157. See supra notes 107-56 and accompanying text.
158. At least one commentator has suggested that minority shareholders have been slighted by the
various state legislatures because of a lack of lobbying power. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations
in the Age of Statutes. 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 393-95 (1992). This argument presumes that the majority shareholders have influence over private interest groups with substantial lobbying power.
159. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii) (1984); see also supra text accompanying note 30 (providing the text of § 14.30(2)(ii)).
160. Cane, supra note 9, at 20; see FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43. The commentary to the FBCA states, "Presumably, illegal activities would be grounds for dissolution by the Department of Legal Affairs under [FBCA § 607.1430(l)(a)]." Id.; accord FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(l)(a)
(1993); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30(I)(ii) (1984).
161. FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43. Some commentators believe that dissolution is
an inadequate remedy for oppressed shareholders anyway. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 24,
at 9-19. In large part, the argument is that involuntary dissolution is a convoluted and inefficient way
to achieve a buy-out of the minority. Id. at 34-35.
162. FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43.
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judgment, was bad for business or bad for the stockholders.'63 If this is
truly the legislature's primary concern, it can adopt other measures that
prevent what it considers frivolous litigation.
Presumably, some controls are already in place to prevent frivolous
lawsuits. The Florida Rules of Judicial Administration allow an attorney to
sign a pleading only if there is "good ground to support it."'" In addition, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct prevent an attorney from
bringing a frivolous proceeding. 65 Violations of either set of rules carry
sanctions. However, if the legislature is concerned that some unwarranted
suits will pass the civil procedure and ethical tests,"6 there are several

other options at its disposal.
First, the legislature could choose to include a definition of oppression
with its enactment of the RMBCA provision. This option would certainly
cut down litigation because, if the majority shareholders' conduct did not
fit the definition, there would be no grounds for minority shareholders to
seek relief. However, this would be no solution. 67 If the legislature were
to define oppression in the statute, it would eliminate the flexibility needed to cope with new and unforeseeable circumstances.' 68 In other jurisdictions, flexibility has allowed the courts to define oppression somewhat
narrowly to prevent frivolous lawsuits, but at the same time, protect minority shareholders.' 69
In Florida as in other jurisdictions, the courts should remain free to
decide on a case-by-case basis what fits the statutory meaning of oppression in any particular set of facts. The legislature, simply by acknowledg-

ing the problem of oppressed minority shareholders in close corporations,

163. Courts have long endeavored to deter such cases. See, e.g., Cates v. Sparkman, I I S.W. 846,
850 (Tex. 1889) (denying relief to the plaintiff who could not show injury with sufficient certainty-the plaintiff actually made a profit from one tract of land involved in the allegedly oppressive
transaction).
164. FLA.R. JUDICIAL ADMIN. 2.060(d).
165. FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT 4-3.1. "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding... unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Id.
166. The comment to Rule 4-3.1 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct notes that the law
contains ambiguities and therefore counsel should be given some leeway in advancing legal arguments.
See FLA. RULES PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4-3.1 cmt. Thus, the legislature may be concerned that this
leeway would permit oppressed minority shareholders to run around the ethical rules. The comment
adds, however, that an action is considered frivolous under the rule if it is brought "primarily for the
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person." Id.
167. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS. supra note 1, § 9.30, at 141.
168. Id. Courts are accustomed to interpreting the definition of words in statutes. See Cane, supra
note 9, at 20. Specifically, the Florida courts have a large body of caselaw from other jurisdictions
from which to define oppression. Id. at 21.
169. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980);.Balvik v. Sylvester,
411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987); O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note I, § 9.30, at 143-44.
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would send a policy message to the courts. 7 The definition of oppression could then be shaped with those policy considerations in mind. 7'
For example, given Florida's legislative concern about excessive litigation,
the courts would be less likely to adopt a reasonable expectations standard
because any focus on the minority shareholders' subjective impressions
lends itself to greater litigation.'
A more sensible approach to limiting litigation would include a provision for the award of attorney fees to the corporation if it is dragged into a
frivolous lawsuit by a minority shareholder.'73 The Florida legislature
could enact a provision similar to section 41 of the Model Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement. 7 4 While Florida has not adopted any part of
the supplement, it could incorporate language from the supplement into
the FBCA. Section 41(b) of the supplement provides: "If the court finds
that a party to the proceeding acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise
not in good faith, it may award one or more other parties their reasonable
expenses, including counsel fees and the expenses of appraisers or other
experts, incurred in the proceeding."'75 The provision, as written, would
apply to either side in the litigation.'76 It could, however, be limited to
the party who brings the proceeding if the legislature deems this limitation
prudent. The fear of paying both their own legal fees and those of the
corporation would deter minority shareholders from bringing actions that
are not well-founded under the statute and relevant caselaw.
In addition to its concerns about litigation, there is some indication
that the Florida legislature is interested in limiting the number of grounds
available to dissolve corporations.'7 7 In the commentary to the FBCA,
the legislative subcommittee indicated its belief that dissolution is an "extreme remedy."'7 Like the commentary to the RMBCA, the subcommittee also emphasized the discretion the courts have in granting dissolution.'79
Most characterizations of dissolution as an extreme remedy result from
a concern about ending the going concern value of an enterprise. 80 For
instance, the FBCA commentary expresses a concern that dissolution will

170.
171.
172.
173.

See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1, § 9.30, at 141.
See id. § 9.30, at 141-42.
See Bruno, supra note 49, at 434.
Cane, supra note 9, at 21.

174.

MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT § 41 (1984).

175. Id. § 41(b).
176. See id.
177. See FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43.
178. See id.

179. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30 cmt. 2b (1984); see FBCA Commentary,
supra note 75, at SP2-43.
180. CLARK, supra note 2, § 18.4.1, at 786; Murdock, supra note 34, at 441.
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have harmful effects on third parties such as employees of the corporation."' However, what the legislature fails to recognize is that dissolution is not synonymous with corporate death.'82 Generally, at liquidation
the buyer will purchase not only the assets, but also the going concern
value. "83
' Additionally, the buyer is often the controlling group of shareholders accused of oppression in the first place." 4 The result is that "the
only real change ...will be the name on the
door. No employees will be
85
terminated, nor any goods or services lost."'
If the legislature is concerned about a fragmented liquidation, where
the assets are sold piecemeal to different buyers without purchase of the86
going concern value, it could adopt an approach similar to Michigan's.
The Michigan legislature enacted section 489 of the Michigan Business
Corporation Act'87 to include relief for "illegal, fraudulent, or willfully
unfair and oppressive" conduct.'88 It then moved the provision from the
dissolution portion of the Act to the shareholder portion of the Act."8 9
While Florida should avoid adopting the "willfully unfair" language in the
Michigan statute,"g moving the provision might quiet some of the
Florida legislature's fears over destruction of going concern values.
Were the Florida legislature to enact a provision making oppression a
ground for relief, it could put the provision in the shareholder section
between sections 607.1301 and 607.1320.' This would place emphasis
on alternative remedies instead of placing emphasis on dissolution."9
The legislature would then have the option of leaving those alternative
remedies to the imagination of the courts, or appending an illustrative list
of alternative remedies like those provided in section 41 of the Model
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement. 93

181. FBCA Commentary, supra note 75, at SP2-43. The concern is that upon dissolution, if "corporate death" ensues, employees will lose their jobs. See id.
182. CLARK, supra note 2, § 18.4.1, at 786-87 n.2; Murdock, supra note 34, at 442-43.
183. Murdock, supra note 34, at 442-43.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable Expectations"-A Primeron an Oppressive Standard,(Part2 of 2),
71 MICH. BJ. 566, 568-69 (June 1992).
187. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (West 1990).
188. Id.
189. See id.; Bruno, supra note 186, at 568.
190. MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (West 1990).
191. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1301-.1302, .1320 (1993). Section 607.1302 deals with dissenters
rights and § 607.1320 provides the procedure for the exercise of dissenter's rights. FLA. STAT. §§
607.1302, .1320 (1993). Section 607.1301 is a definitional section. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301 (1993).
192. Bruno, supra note 186, at 568.
193. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT § 41(a) (1984). Alternatives include setting
aside any action of the directors or shareholders, canceling or altering any provision in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws, and an award of damages. Id.; see also Baker v. Commercial Body Builders,
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As an option to putting the oppression provision in a different part of
the FBCA, the legislature could adopt RMBCA section 14.34,"9 which
provides the defendant corporation with the option to buy out the petitioning shareholder at fair value if a dissolution proceeding is brought against
the corporation.195 Adopting this section would prevent the destruction of
any going concern value and would simultaneously reduce unnecessary
litigation. 91 6 The official comment to section 14.34' 9 states that the
provision is designed to prevent abuse of the litigation process by making
the minority shareholder's shares subject to a call within ninety days of
the filing of the petition. 9 ' Thus the Florida legislature could kill two
fears with one stone-its fear of destroying the going concern value and
its fear of unnecessary litigation.

507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Or. 1973). The alternative in § 41 that provides for the appointment of a custodian already exists as an alternative under the FBCA. FLA. STAT. § 607.1432 (1993).
194. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.34 (1984).
195. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.34(a) (1984). Section 14.34(a) states that in a
proceeding to dissolve a corporation that does not have its shares listed on a national exchange, the
corporation or the shareholders may elect to purchase the shares of the petitioning shareholder at fair
value. Id. If the parties cannot agree on the fair value the court may determine the fair value of the
shares as of the day before the petition was filed. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.34(d)
(1984). The section contains elaborate procedural requirements for filing and payment of fair value.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.34 (1984).
The effectiveness of the buyout remedy is only as successful as the accuracy of the valuation
process. Murdock, supra note 34, at 471. Regardless of the method of valuation used, there is an element of speculation in the process. Many jurisdictions use the "Delaware block" method to value the
shares of a corporation. See generally Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1456-71 (1966). The parties in Francis 1. duPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973), estimated the future earnings, market value, and assets of the
corporation. Id. at 346. Then, in accordance with the Delaware block method, they applied a percentage weight to each of those factors, which when multiplied by the value of the factors and added
together, resulted in an approximate value of the corporation's outstanding shares. Id. The speculative
nature of the weighting system is evidenced by the plaintiff's value ($131.89 per share), the
defendant's value ($52.36 per share) and the appraiser's value ($91.47 per share). Id. Because of the
flexibility involved in weighing each factor and the inherently speculative nature of projecting earnings, market value, and asset value, the Delaware block method was abandoned in Delaware. See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983). However, other jurisdictions continue to
use the method. See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Mass.
1979). For an advanced discussion of ways in which valuation methods should be adjusted to more
accurately reflect the minority shareholder's position in the corporation, see Murdock, supra note 34,
at 471-88.
196. Thompson, supra note 25, at 723. A buyout provision would also reduce the minority
shareholders' use of judicial dissolution as a tactic to gain bargaining power. Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 24, at 46. Professors Hetherington and Dooley have developed a long and detailed proposal
for the ultimate buyout statute. Id. at 52-59.
197. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 14.34 cmt. (1984).
198. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.34 cmt. (1984); Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 24, at 58-59.
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V. CONCLUSION

Given the ways oppression statutes have been construed, enacting
oppression as a statutory ground for relief is not a panacea.'" However,
the interpretative problems associated with the term oppression are a necessary evil to maintain the flexibility necessary to cover various factual
circumstances. 2" There can be no doubt that some interpretations could
lead to increased litigation in this area, but increased litigation is not synonymous with unnecessary litigation. Conserving judicial resources is not
reason enough on its own to exclude a class of persons who should be
entitled to relief under the law.2"' Unnecessary lawsuits can be prevented
by enacting provisions for attorney fees and relating them to causes of
action based on the, oppression ground for relief."
Furthermore, dissolution is not as drastic a remedy as it might first
appear." 3 In addition to the fact that dissolution is normally discretionary
with the court, in the majority of cases where dissolution has been granted
there has been no termination of the going concern.2' If the legislature
still sees dissolution as extreme, it is free to provide for alternative relief...
Some of the Florida legislature's concerns have merit. But Florida
remains one of only thirteen states that fails to provide some type of statutory relief for minority shareholders who are treated unfairly in the close
corporations setting.' Given the rapid rise of the corporate form in Florida, 0 7 it is imperative that Florida catch up with the times and add oppression to its statutory grounds for shareholder relief.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
Cane, supra note 9, at 21.
See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
See Thompson, supra note 25, at 709.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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